

VZCZCXRO9331

PP RUEHBZ RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG

DE RUCNDT #1155 3452219

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 112219Z DEC 07

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3312

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0214

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1119

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 1055

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001155

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [UNMIK](#) [KV](#) [YI](#)

SUBJECT: CDG MINUS RUSSIA DISCUSSES RUSSIAN PRST ELEMENTS  
AND DECEMBER 19 MEETING

**¶11. (SBU)** On December 10, Ambassador Khalilzad convoked Permreps of the CDG minus Russia to discuss the Russian distributed elements for a PRST and format issues for the December 19 UNSC meeting on the Troika report. Ambassador Khalilzad framed the options for dealing with Russia's PRST elements and for pushing for direct Kosovar participation in the Security Council meeting. UK Permrep Sawers argued all should keep in mind Russia's goals of preventing closure of the Kosovo issue in the UNSC and dividing Europeans, and therefore, oppose a PRST. Belgian Permrep Verbeke believed there could be a tactical advantage in some kind of compromise PRST containing anodyne language because Russia then could not reasonably ask for more later. German Permrep Matussek noted that Verbeke's argument assumes, probably incorrectly, that Russia is ready to agree to any text, which was unlikely so proposing "killer amendments" would be a better approach. France's PolCoordinator also spoke in favor of "killer amendments," such as adding that the Ahtisaari plan should go into effect in 120 days. France did not think a benign PRST was necessary or that Russia would agree to one. Sawers stated that even a neutral PRST would draw us into Russia's game and undesirably show the UNSC to be engaged.

**¶12. (SBU)** Ambassador Khalilzad raised the issue of how to show the Council is deadlocked and asked whether we could use affirmation of the Ahtisaari plan for that purpose. Sawyers argued that attempting to use a resolution to show blockage in the Council has the disadvantage that if it does not work it could call into question our plans for going forward. Sawers argued for a "political approach" of telling Permrep Churkin directly that we do not accept his PRST and do not want to engage on it. Ambassador Khalilzad proposed giving to experts the question of how to kill Russia's PRST.

**¶13. (SBU)** In a follow-on meeting on December 11, CDG minus experts met and tentatively agreed on a proposal to raise Russia's elements on the margins of consultations on December 14 and have one member deliver coordinated points in a press statement after the meeting that could also be distributed to Security Council members. Those present also agreed, subject to agreement from capitals, to request that President Sejdiu be allowed to speak for the Kosovars on December 19 in a public meeting and to be prepared to accept a private meeting as a fallback. The group agreed to divide up meeting elected Security Council members to sound out their views in advance of December 19.

Khalilzad